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Does California’s Senate Bill 1368, which requires all long-term 
utility contracts with power generators to meet a greenhouse gas 
emission standard, violate the dormant Commerce Clause?  The law will 
affect the interstate trade of electric power, but will that effect allow a 
constitutional challenge to S.B. 1368 and others like it to succeed?  What 
are the arguments that will be made in a potential challenge, and what 
would be the likely ruling? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Recent proposals to limit greenhouse gases (GHGs) on the 
federal level, including cap-and-trade systems, have failed.1  The 
Lieberman-Warner bill2 was the most likely to succeed but failed to 
make it to a Senate floor vote in June 2008.3  While this failure may 
have reflected poorly on the chances of passing federal climate-change 
legislation, most commentators see it as a sign that Congress will send a 
bill with more stringent requirements to the President before the end of 
2009.4  As of this writing, the U.S. House of Representatives had passed 
a climate-change bill with a stringent matching bill working its way 
through the Senate.5  Commentators have questioned whether the current 
bill could be passed before the 2010 Copenhagen summit on climate 
change, a feat that would be important for those urging the United States 
to lead the way on international climate policy.6  However, the shape of 
such a climate bill is uncertain and likely to undergo multiple 
 1. Zachary Coile, Climate Bill’s Defeat Sets Stage for Tough Round 2, S.F. CHRON., 
June 7, 2008, at A2; See Haik Gugarats, U.S. House Greenhouse Bill Even Tougher Than 
Lieberman-Warner, GAS PROCESSORS REP., June 11, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 
11486328; Margot Roosevelt, Trying to Reset Climate Clock, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008, 
at B1. 
 2. Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2008).  
For a brief discussion of the bill, see infra note 173. 
 3. David M. Herszenhorn, After Verbal Fire, Senate Effectively Kills Climate 
Change Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/07/ 
washington/07climate.html; Gugarats, supra note 1. 
 4. John Broder, Senate Opens Debate on Politically Risky Bill Addressing Global 
Warming, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2008, at A16; Herszenhorn, supra note 3; Gugarats, supra 
note 1. 
 5. Louis Charbonneau & Gerard Wynn, Obama’s Climate-Change Hopes Get a 
Boost, REUTERS, Oct. 12, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSN 
1252318120091012?feedType=RSS&feedName=environmentNews. 
 6. Id.; see Jim Tankersley, Obama Moves Forward with Plan to Cut Emissions, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at A11, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/25/nation/ 
na-climate-econ25 (discussing that a cap-and-trade bill was passed in the House and is 
estimated to make it to the Senate for discussion in late 2009). 
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reformations before the end of 2009.7  One of the most important features 
of the bill will be the role of states in limiting GHGs. 
Nearly all stakeholders in the debate prefer federal action on GHG 
emissions. Environmental and public interest groups desire as large of a 
cut in GHG emissions as possible and see federal legislation as the only 
appropriate means to lower U.S. emissions as a whole.8  The scientific 
community agrees, claiming that because climate change acts on a global 
scale, any state is far too small of a contributor to make a perceptible 
impact on its own.9  Business groups have largely accepted regulation as 
inevitable and are calling for clear, national standards rather than a 
patchwork of different regulations for each state.10  In the absence of 
such federal legislation, California and other states have passed laws 
aimed at reducing statewide GHG emissions.  While it is settled that the 
federal government can preempt states on this issue,11 the question is 
whether the Constitution allows states to act on such an enormous 
problem in the federal government’s absence. 
California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (A.B. 32)12 grabbed many 
headlines in 2006 because of the GHG-reduction targets it established.13  
But for many in the electricity industry, 2006’s Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Performance Standard (S.B. 1368)14 was actually the more 
 7. Nathaniel Gronewold, Sen. Boxer Says Obama Admin Could Make Climate 
Pledge in Copenhagen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
gwire/2009/10/12/12greenwire-sen-boxer-says-obama-admin-could-make-climate-39754.html. 
 8. RICK DUKE & DAN LASHOF, THE NEW ENERGY ECONOMY: PUTTING AMERICA 
ON THE PATH TO SOLVING GLOBAL WARMING 8 (2008), http://nrdc.org/globalWarming/ 
energy/eeconomy.pdf (arguing that federal government must act to have an impact on global 
warming). 
 9. Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role 
for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 67-73 (2007). 
 10. DUKE & LASHOF, supra note 8, at 10 (“Twenty-seven major U.S. corporations— 
including industry giants such as General Electric, General Motors, DuPont, 
AIG, Caterpillar, and Shell—have joined the NRDC and other nonprofit organizations to 
form the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) to advocate for federal legislation to 
cut emissions by 60 to 80 percent by 2050.”). 
 11. See The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 12. California Global Warming Solutions Act, Assemb. 32, 2005-2006 (Cal. 2006). 
 13. Mark Martin, A Global Warming Moment, S.F. CHRONICLE, Sept. 28, 2006, at 
A-1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/09/28/WARMING. 
TMP; Josh Richman, Governor Signs Historic Bill to Reduce Greenhouse Gases, 
OAKLAND TRIB., Sept. 28, 2006, available at, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/ 
is_20060928/ai_n16765531/?tag=content;col1. 
 14. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8340-41 (West 2009). 
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significant piece of legislation.15  S.B. 1368 prevents all California utilities, 
both privately and publicly owned, from signing long-term contracts 
with a power plant that produces more greenhouse gases per unit of 
power than the prevailing natural-gas standard—set at 1,100 pounds of 
carbon dioxide per megawatt hour.16  California’s climate action closely 
follows the timeline and standards established by the Kyoto Protocol,17 
leading some to argue that California’s legislation was the State’s way of 
indirectly “signing” the treaty, despite the legal restraints that would 
otherwise prohibit such an action.18 
One major hurdle for California legislators in drafting A.B. 32 and 
S.B. 1368 was striking a realistic balance between GHG reduction and 
effective enforcement.19  S.B. 1368’s stated goal was to demonstrate 
leadership regarding the “sustainability of our planet.”20  Legislators and 
commentators work under the general assumption that strict regulations 
on in-state carbon emissions will lead industries to relocate to nearby 
states, where loose or non-existent carbon rules allow for cheaper energy 
production.21  Legislators did not want to act in a way that would hurt 
 15. Rich Saskal, California Public Utilities Feeling the Effects of Greenhouse Gas 
Bill, 258 BOND BUYER 34, Dec. 22, 2006; Lyn Corum, Governor Schwarzenegger Signs 
Legislation that Will Limit Coal-Fired Imports into California, GLOBAL POWER REP., 
Oct. 5, 2006, at 23; John Myers, The Other Greenhouse Gas Bill…, CAPITAL NOTES, Sept. 27, 
2006, http://blogs.kqed.org/capitalnotes/2006/09/27/the-other-greenhouse-gas-bill-2/. 
 16. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(b)(1)-(d)(2).  The Greenhouse Gases Emission 
Standard requires the PUC to set the performance standard at “no higher than the rate of 
emissions of greenhouse gases for combined-cycle natural gas baseload generation.”  
CAL. PUBL. UTIL. COMM’N, PUC SETS GHG EMISSIONS PERFORMANCE STANDARD TO 
HELP MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE, Jan. 25, 2007, http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/ 
News_release/63997.htm; see CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(d)(1).  Notably, this standard 
only would restrict coal-fired power plants. 
 17. The California standards called for larger cuts than the original Kyoto Protocol.  
See U.K. and California: Environmental Pals, Blair and Schwarzenegger to Consider 
Methods to Reduce Greenhouse Gases, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 1, 2006, at 10 
[hereinafter Environmental Pals]. 
 18. Margot Roosevelt, California Offers to Lead on Climate Change Fight, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at A22; Samantha Young, Schwarzenegger Opens Climate 
Summit with Obama, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 19, 2008.  States cannot sign international 
treaties, as it would violate the foreign affairs power.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 19. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(b)(1)-(d)(2); CAL. PUBL. UTIL. COMM’N, PUC 
SETS GHG EMISSIONS PERFORMANCE STANDARD TO HELP MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE, 
Jan. 25, 2007, http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/News_release/63997.htm; Environmental 
Pals, supra note 17. 
 20. Judy Lin, Some Legislators Thinking Green: Democrats Pushing Bills, Opposed by 
Business, on Water and Air Quality, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 2, 2006 (quoting then-
Assembly Speaker Fabian Nunez, D-Los Angeles). 
 21. This phenomenon is generally referred to as “race to the bottom.” For a 
discussion of the novelty of California’s “bottom-up” regulation of an issue that at most 
requires a “top-down” solution, see Kaswan, supra note 9, at 62-64; Kirsten Engel, State 
and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments 
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the State economically, especially if they only shuffled around certain 
power contracts without a net drop in GHG emissions.22  This concept is 
referred to as “leakage,” meaning that to the extent that carbon emissions 
in California are reduced, those reductions would move or “leak” into 
other states that have little or no GHG regulations.23  This would even 
out any in-state reductions to a large-scale net reduction of zero. 
To reduce leakage, California legislators aimed to regulate the power 
that the state consumes, not just what it produces in-state.  Currently 
18.2% of electricity consumed in California comes from coal.24  
However, over 90% of California’s coal-fired power is imported from 
other states, which makes regulating coal emissions problematic.25  
Because of this system, for California to lessen the amount of emissions, 
it must change the type of power its utilities buy from out-of-state 
generators, which creates a potential dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge.  For S.B. 1368 to withstand scrutiny, California will have to 
show that the law is not facially discriminatory, the goal is legitimate, 
there is no easier or localized solution, and the value of S.B. 1368 
outweighs the burdens it places on the interstate power market. 
This Article addresses whether S.B. 1368 could hold up to a 
Commerce Clause challenge in three stages.  Part II discusses the dormant 
Commerce Clause and how it is applied to state laws that potentially 
affect interstate commerce.  It explains the history and development of 
the concept and fleshes out the two-step test that exists today: (1) courts 
determine whether a law is facially discriminatory; (2) if not, courts 
apply a test that weighs the respective burdens and benefits of the law.  
to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and 
Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1020-22 (2006). 
 22. Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. 
REV. 1621, 1670-71 (2008). 
 23. For a full discussion of free-riding—non-regulating states benefiting from GHG 
reductions in regulated states—and leakage, see Cary Coglianese & Jocelyn D’Ambrosio, 
Policymaking Under Pressure: The Perils of Incremental Responses to Climate Change, 
40 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1419-20 (2008); Joseph Allan MacDougald, Why Climate Law 
Must Be Federal: The Clash Between Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and State 
Greenhouse Gas Trading Systems, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1431, 1437, 1446-47 (2008); 
Benjamin Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need 
for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
397, 465-68 (2008). 
 24. MICHAEL NYBERG ET AL., CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2008 NET SYSTEM POWER 
REPORT 5 (2009), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/CEC-200-2009-010/CEC-
200-2009-010-CMF.PDF. 
 25. Id. 
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Part II also discusses the different ways in which many of the current 
Supreme Court Justices interpret and apply the dormant Commerce Clause.  
Part III applies the current interpretations and tests of the dormant 
Commerce Clause to S.B. 1368.  Part IV addresses some of the policy 
considerations involved in the federal and state intersection.  States 
should be allowed to impose their own climate-change laws and to set 
their own caps, following the model of cooperative federalism.  This 
Article concludes by noting that while legislation like S.B. 1368 may not 
be the best solution to global warming, in the absence of federal 
legislation, it amounts to legitimate state action.  Further, S.B. 1368 
serves as a role model that will hopefully inspire a cooperative 
federalism model. 
II.  THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The dormant Commerce Clause is based on an interpretation of 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the ability 
to legislate on interstate commerce.26  While the Commerce Clause 
clearly states that only the federal government can regulate interstate 
trade, courts have understood a “negative” or “dormant” aspect to this 
restraint.27  This suggests that even without federal action, states have no 
right to legislate in areas that affect interstate commerce.28  The federal 
government’s singular power to affect interstate trade came as a result of 
the economic Balkanization and retaliatory state tariffs in the United 
States under the Articles of Confederation.29  The framers wanted to 
show that the United States’ “economic unit is the Nation, which alone 
has the gamut of powers necessary to control the economy.”30  Courts 
have carved a major exception to this rule—the market participant 
doctrine, which excludes all state action from the dormant Commerce 
Clause when the state is acting in the market as a participant and not a 
regulator.31 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 27. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-36 (1979). 
 30. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1949); see also 
Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (“The Constitution was 
framed . . . upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, 
and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”); THE 
FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing how the Constitution was meant to 
prevent local protectionism as a form of retaliation). 
 31. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803, 809-10 (1976); see also 
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 588-89 (1997); 
White v. Mass. Council of Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206-08 (1983); Reeves, 
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980). 
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The test used to identify a dormant Commerce Clause violation has 
undergone significant change over its lifetime.  Scholars, judges, and 
commentators have argued for a one-,32 two-,33 and three-tiered34 tests.  
Courts generally now apply a two-tiered test and take many relevant 
factors into the second tier.35  First, a court must decide whether a law is 
facially discriminatory, evidenced by a different standard for in- and out-
of-state businesses “that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”36  
Then if the law is found to be facially discriminatory, it is subjected to 
strict scrutiny,37 under which a court looks for extraordinary reasons for 
the local regulation.38  Strict scrutiny is as tough as it sounds, and is 
sometimes referred to as the “per se” test because, for all practical 
purposes, the law becomes per se invalid if it is found to be facially 
discriminatory.39  If the regulation at issue is not invalidated by the first 
part of the test, the court asks a second question, which is whether the 
law serves a legitimate local purpose and is applied in a rational manner; 
then the court must rule based on whether the regulation places an 
“undue burden” on commerce.40 
A.  Testing for Violations of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Under part one of the dormant Commerce Clause test, laws that are 
facially discriminatory towards out-of-state interests are struck down.  If 
 32. Justices Scalia looks only for facial discrimination, discussed infra Part I(a). 
 33. This is referred to as the Pike test, which looks for facial discrimination, then if 
none is found, weighs the respective interests.  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 
142 (1970). 
 34. This test is different from the Pike test in that it removes the test for alternative 
methods, legitimate purpose, or rational relationship from the Pike test and examines the 
factor on its own. 
 35. See United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 
550 U.S. 330, 338, 345, 347 (2007); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 
U.S. 383, 389-90 (1994).  While both cases rest heavily on a public/private distinction, 
they also support a two-tiered test. 
 36. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); see 
also Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 879, 894 (2008). 
 37. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578–
79 (1986). 
 38. See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 353-54. 
 39. David S. Day, The Expanded Concept of Facial Discrimination in the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 497, 498 n.3 (2007) (noting only one 
discriminatory law has passed this test). 
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the legislative intent is to put out-of-state interests at a disadvantage, 
even to a small extent,41 the law cannot pass strict scrutiny.42  For 
instance, regulations barring milk depots from shipping out-of-state,43 
controlling the exportation of minnows,44 and keeping packaging or any 
type of processing in-state,45 have all been struck down as facially 
discriminatory because their drafters’ intention was to put out-of-state 
interests at a disadvantage solely because of their location.  If the intent 
of the law was not to discriminate against out-of-state interests, it is put 
to the balancing test developed in Pike.46  In this test, the burden on 
interstate commerce imposed by the regulation is weighed against the 
state interest in regulation; if the benefit to the state is weak or the 
impact on trade strong, the regulation is usually struck down.47  The Pike 
Court put forth the following statement of the law: “Where the statute 
regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, 
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”48  In weighing the 
burden and benefits in the second part of the Pike test, courts examine 
many aspects of the law in question. 
The “burden” is given weight by first looking to see if there are 
alternatives that would accomplish the state goal without imposing on 
 41. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269-70, 276 (1988) (“Where 
discrimination is patent . . . neither a widespread advantage to in-state interests nor a 
widespread disadvantage to out-of-state competitors need be shown.”); Pike, 397 U.S. at 
142; Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade 
Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1117-18 (2008) (discussing the development of the 
“undue burden” test from the “barriers to trade” test). 
 42. Only one law has passed the test.  See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 
(1986) (ruling a law banning baitfish from out-of-state, while discriminatory, was still 
valid because of the threat posed to the environment by the fish). 
 43. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 544-545 (1949). 
 44. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-38 (1979).  Contra Taylor, 447 U.S. 
131 (law banning baitfish).  The threat that the out-of-state fish posed to survival of the 
local fish was the difference in these cases. 
 45. E.g., S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84 (1984) (timber); 
Pike, 397 U.S. at 139, 142 (melons). 
 46. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.  This test has roots in Southern Pacific v. Arizona, 325 
U.S. 761, 779-80 (1945) (striking an Arizona requirement that cantaloupes grown in-
state had to be packaged before transported out-of-state). 
 47. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (“[T]he question becomes one of degree.  And the extent 
of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local 
interest involved . . . .”); see also New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 
(1988) (“The Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to give its 
residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of that description in 
connection with the State’s regulation of interstate commerce.”). 
 48. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 
362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)). 
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interstate commerce.49  If it can be shown that there is a cheaper and 
easier way to remedy the target problem without burdening interstate 
commerce, courts will give the law very little deference when applying 
the Pike test.50  For example, in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 
Minnesota was allowed to ban all plastic milk cartons because they 
caused problems in landfills, wasted energy, and generally “deplete[d] 
natural resources.”51  The Court could not find an “approach with ‘a lesser 
impact on interstate activities’” that would have accomplished Minnesota’s 
valid goal of protecting natural resources, so it applied the Pike test.52 
In conceptualizing the burden on interstate commerce, courts also 
examine who the burden falls upon.  In Clover Leaf, most Minnesota 
milk carton producers used paperboard, not plastic, so they and would 
not be burdened by the law.53  Therefore, the burden would fall on out-
of-state plastic carton producers, which would normally arouse suspicion 
that the law was facially discriminatory.  However, the Court found that 
the alleged burden on out-of-state milk carton producers was “exaggerated”54 
because the account of paper cartons could have come from out-of-state, 
and some of the plastic carton manufacturers were in Minnesota.55  
Similarly, in United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
Management Authority, the Court found that the burden of a waste-
 49. See id. (“And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of 
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be 
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”); Great Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 375-77 (1976) (finding that where local inspections 
could serve purpose of ensuring that local health standards were met, statute permitting 
sale of out-of-state milk in Mississippi only if the state of origin allowed sale therein of 
Mississippi milk on a reciprocal basis impermissibly burdened commerce); see also 
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1951) (ruling that a regulation 
protecting the safety of milk was deemed invalid because there were much better options 
available to meet said goal). 
 50. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353-54 (1977) 
(finding that North Carolina could have easily used other methods to provide consumers 
with certification of apples). 
 51. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472-74 (1981) 
(“Since the statute does not discriminate between interstate and intrastate commerce, the 
controlling question is whether the incidental burden imposed on interstate commerce by 
the Minnesota Act is ‘clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’”) (quoting 
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142). 
 52. Id. (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 142). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (citing the inference that some of the replacements for plastic jugs would 
come from out-of-state wood, and that plastic would continue to be used, just in different 
products). 
 55. Id. 
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processing requirement would be carried by the very citizens that voted 
for it, which was evidence that the citizens had judged for themselves 
that the benefit was worth the burden.56 
The counterbalance to the harm that the burden causes in the Pike test 
is the benefit the in-state interests receive from a regulation.  In order 
give appropriate significance to the benefit, a court looks to whether the 
goal of the regulation is a “legitimate local interest.”57 The Clover Leaf 
Court ruled that Minnesota had a “substantial state interest in promoting 
conservation of energy and other natural resources and easing solid 
waste disposal problems”—a goal strong enough to justify the regulatory 
scheme.58  Because the Minnesota legislature did not enact the ban to 
give an advantage to in-state producers, and since the benefit of less 
plastic in landfills was strong, the law was upheld.59 
Another factor determining the benefit in the Pike test is whether the 
law is “rationally related” to its stated goal.  This test exists to prevent 
states from passing discriminatory legislation disguised as environmental 
or health regulations.60  The Supreme Court has made it clear that there 
is a thin line between discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect, 
and barring clear evidence of discriminatory intent, it would largely 
defer to legislatures.61  The Court did find discriminatory intent in Hunt 
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (Washington Apple), 
where North Carolina’s apple licensing scheme was created to protect 
in-state apple growers because the apples it was trying to keep out were 
subject to more stringent testing.62 If health was North Carolina’s 
concern, its less stringent requirements were not “rationally related to 
their supposed purpose of maintaining apple standards” because 
 56. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 
U.S. 330, 343 (2007). 
 57. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392-94 (1994) 
(ruling that a flow control ordinance meant to finance a waste processor was not within 
the bounds of a “legitimate local interest”). 
 58. Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 473. 
 59. Id. at 471-74. 
 60. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393 (stating that there are alternate means to reach the stated 
health goal of the garbage flow regulation).  A stream of analysis takes place in judging 
whether the regulation is the least restrictive option. Christine A. Klein, The Environmental 
Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 57-59 (2003). 
 61. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276 (1988) (stating that 
the effects did not need to weigh heavily on out-of-state interests, that discrimination was 
enough); City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978) (stating that 
protectionism is difficult to determine, and in that case, the facially discriminatory 
purpose was clear); Walgreen Co. v. Rullan, 405 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding a 
dormant Commerce Clause violation, but only because the law was de jure and de facto 
protectionism). 
 62. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-54 (1977). 
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Washington’s standards were at least as strong.63  The Court noted that 
the effect of the regulation, and most likely its goal, was to protect the 
North Carolina market for local apples.64  There was no benefit; thus any 
burden at all that the regulation would have on interstate commerce 
would fail the Pike test.65 
Another aspect of the Pike test is referred to as “extraterritoriality,” 
meaning that a state’s regulation controls activities that occur entirely in 
other states.66  In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor 
Authority, the Court struck down a New York law requiring all liquor 
sellers to keep their prices in New York at or below the price they 
charged anywhere else in the nation.67  While the law regulated liquor 
prices in-state, it set that price based on the lowest price in neighboring 
states, which effectively regulated liquor prices for the region, not just 
New York.68  The Court examined the state law’s impacts and found that 
it would result in companies being barred from raising prices anywhere 
in the country above what New York had listed; this impermissibly 
impacted interstate commerce.69  The goal of securing cheaper prices for 
New York residents was not important enough to justify the regulation, 
so the law failed the Pike test.70  Brown-Forman, in conjunction with the 
Pike analysis, illustrates that states cannot attempt to control commerce 
in an action that takes place entirely outside of its borders.71 
In applying this Pike test, the Court must weigh the costs and benefits 
of regulations while examining their motives and methods.  If a law is 
not facially discriminatory, courts must examine the law’s relationship to 
its purpose and any extraterritorial impacts.  Historically, the Court 
examines the intent of environmental laws intensely and has invalidated 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  The Court found that the “open space” concerns brought in a dairy-pricing 
case were not appropriate environmental concerns and were completely incidental to the 
legislative action.  See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204-05 n.20 
(1994). 
 65. Washington Apple, 432 U.S. at 352-54.  The Court also seemed to be particularly 
galled by the fact that the law itself came from the state apple lobby.  Id. 
 66. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332-33 (1989); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, 
Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1522-23 (2007). 
 67. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 577, 
583-84 (1986). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 581-84. 
 70. This reasoning was followed in Healy, 491 U.S. at 332-33. 
 71. Id.; Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 581-84. 
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environmental restrictions on materials coming both in72 and out73 of 
states.  To withstand scrutiny, natural resource regulations have to be 
appropriately targeted, with statements elucidating their rationales and 
intentions to regulate within a state’s borders, for a court to rule that any 
effect on interstate commerce is constitutionally permissible.74 
B.  Current State of the Court on the Dormant Commerce Clause 
The current and future Supreme Court’s application of the dormant 
Commerce Clause is uncertain,75 especially because the analysis requires 
“eschew[ing] formalism for a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes 
and effects.”76  Two Supreme Court Justices have clearly stated their 
rejection of the Pike test, and one of them would only strike down state 
laws that are facially discriminatory.77  Other members of the Court are 
split on the application.  The most important aspects of any dormant 
Commerce Clause question in the current Supreme Court is whether the 
law at issue amounts to facial discrimination and what value will be 
ascribed to the law under the Pike test.78 
Justices Scalia and Thomas will not likely strike down any non-
discriminatory state regulation that has an impact on interstate commerce.  
They believe that the interplay between state and federal regulations 
should be decided by the respective legislatures.79  Absent stare decisis 
concerns, Justice Scalia would invalidate state laws only when they are 
clearly facially discriminatory,80 while Justice Thomas believes that 
 72. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978) (finding that barring 
incoming trash is a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 73. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-38 (1979) (finding that barring taking 
minnows is a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 74. Edwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change and the Constitution,  
37 ENVTL L. REV. 10,653, at 10,659 (stating that California strengthens its claim to a 
strong state interest in GHG regulation as long as it “compiles a record documenting the 
effectiveness of its regulatory measures in accomplishing the state’s legitimate objectives”). 
 75. Id. at 10657 (citing Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 
520 U.S. 564, 610-12 (1997) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(calling the application of the dormant Commerce Clause a “tangled underbrush” and “virtually 
unworkable in practice”)). 
 76. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994). 
 77. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
 78. Nathan E. Endrud, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued 
Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy 
Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 266 (2008). 
 79. Kenneth Starr, The Roberts Court and the Business Cases, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 
541, 544-45 (2008) (stating that in the absence of federal legislation on the issue, states 
have the right to act). 
 80. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1821 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part) (stating that legislators, not judges, are better at weighing the respective burdens 
and benefits of legislation); United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
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states have a full right to regulate in matters of interstate commerce, 
reading a more literal interpretation that the Commerce Clause has no 
“dormant” effect.81  Justice Thomas has expressed his view that all state 
regulations that affect interstate trade are valid until superseded by the 
federal government.82  Scholars observe that Justice Scalia’s and Justice 
Thomas’s positions have influenced the Court because recent dormant 
Commerce Clause cases have been limited to facially discriminatory 
regulations, and some of the other Justices simply attempt to avoid 
confrontation with Justices Scalia and Thomas on whether non-
discriminatory laws need to undergo the Pike balancing test at all.83 
Justice Breyer also tends to grant greater deference to state regulations 
that affect interstate commerce, looking primarily at costs and benefits 
rather than intent.  He would likely allow state legislation, absent clear 
evidence that a regulation heavily burdens out-of-state interests or 
protects in-state interests, for the benefit of the free market.84  Similarly, 
Chief Justice Roberts gives leeway to states in their regulation of goods 
and services that might have an interstate impact, as long as clear 
discrimination is not the impetus for the regulation.85  He went so far as 
to state that the “dormant Commerce Clause is not a roving license for 
federal courts to decide what activities are appropriate for state and local 
government[s] to undertake[] and what activities must be the province of 
private market competition,”86 evidencing a persuasion to permit state 
Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 348 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
Pike test “is ill suited to the judicial function and should be undertaken rarely if at all”); 
David S. Day, The “Mature” Rehnquist Court and the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine: the Expanded Discrimination Tier, 52 S.D. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (2007). 
 81. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 352 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (“To the 
extent that Congress does not exercise its authority to make that choice, the Constitution 
does not limit the States’ power to regulate commerce. In the face of congressional silence, 
the States are free to set the balance between protectionism and the free market. Instead of 
accepting this constitutional reality, the Court’s negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
gives nine Justices of this Court the power to decide the appropriate balance.”). 
 82. Id. (“To the extent that Congress does not exercise its authority to make that 
choice, the Constitution does not limit the States’ power to regulate commerce.”) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
 83. Day, supra note 80, at 51. 
 84. Id. at 46 (comparing Justice Breyer’s decisions in S.-Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. 
Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 169 (1999) and Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433-36 (2005)). 
 85. See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 340-47 (plurality); Kenneth L. Karst, From 
Carbone to United Haulers: The Advocates’ Tales, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 237, 276-77. 
 86. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 343. 
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regulations.  In United Haulers, he further explained his views that state 
governments are given leeway to pursue “health, safety[,] and welfare” 
laws and that when those burdened are the ones that established the 
regulations, such regulations are acceptable.87  However, based on his 
dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA, Chief Justice Roberts appears to hold a 
low opinion of environmental regulations88—particularly climate-change 
regulation,89 so a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a climate-
change regulation might render Chief Justice Roberts conflicted. 
Although Justice Ginsburg has not assigned herself to a particular 
point of view on the application of the dormant Commerce Clause to 
environmental regulations, she is often placed in the “liberal” camp that 
provides leeway for the federal government to act.90  She has 
traditionally been lenient when the federal government passes a law for 
general health and safety reasons, affording the federal government 
broad deference to legislate.91  Similarly, Justice Stevens is also somewhat 
unclear in his application.92  He applies the Pike test but would grant 
deference to a state law if Congress, by its silence, has allowed it.93  
These Justices face Chief Justice Roberts’s challenge, only juxtaposed: 
they find environmental laws compelling, yet have reasoned so in a way 
that oftentimes supports federal action over states’ rights to act. 
Justice Kennedy takes a hard line on the issue and would likely strike 
down a state action that has out-of-state effects.  In this aspect, he is like 
Justice Breyer, but Justice Kennedy’s viewpoint was influenced by his 
desire to promote a national economy unfettered by individual state 
regulation.94  Commentators have attributed this to a strict adherence to 
the Commerce Clause and a strong belief in “antiregulatory, procompetitive 
ideals,”95 but such a view not without limit.96  In Carbone, Justice Kennedy 
 87. Id. at 345. 
 88. This opinion was on display as recently as United Haulers, as Chief Justice Roberts 
did not join the rest of the plurality in extolling the virtues of recycling and that the state 
had full interest in increasing it.  Id. at 1798.  Interestingly, Justice Scalia did not join this 
aspect of the decision, but did concur with the larger decision allowing the regulation.  Id. at 
348.  It can be assumed that dormant Commerce Clause challenges with regard to climate- 
change regulation would receive similar treatment. 
 89. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535-38 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 90. Karst, supra note 85, at 247. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 246. 
 93. Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens’s Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2149-51 (2006); Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional 
Acquiescence and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1787 (2004). 
 94. Karst, supra note 85, at 247. 
 95. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1822 (2008) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); Richard H. Fallon, The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Federalism Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 470-71 (2002); Michael C. Blumm & 
Sherry L. Bosse, Justice Kennedy and the Environment: Property, State’s Rights, and a 
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wrote that the garbage flow control ordinance at issue was invalid 
because it attained its goal simply by “depriving competitors” of access 
to the market,97 evidencing a belief that state regulations that complicate 
and burden trade are examined and tested by the dormant Commerce 
Clause.98  In Justice Kennedy’s view, a law’s equal application to in-
state and out-of-state operators does not grant the regulation a pass; 
rather, he examines the law’s real-world impact on interstate trade.99  
Justice Alito appears to agree, judging by his dissent in United Haulers, 
and he would set the bar high to deem state infringement on interstate 
commerce acceptable.100 
III.  DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE’S APPLICATION TO S.B. 1368 
Power generators and out-of-state electricity importers are considering 
bringing a lawsuit against California, claiming that S.B. 1368 violates 
the dormant Commerce Clause.101  The suit is likely to come from Utah 
and Wyoming power generators, as they provide a large proportion of 
California’s out-of-state, coal-generated power.102  Anticipating such a 
Persistent Search for Nexus, 82 WASH. L. REV. 667, 721-22 (2007) (“Kennedy’s 
devotion to states’ rights apparently does not extend to what he considers to be 
overregulation: while he prefers state regulation to federal regulation, he prefers one 
level of regulation to two, and the market to regulation.  His states’ rights advocacy may 
actually be part of a larger deregulatory preference.”). 
 96. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (“The Commerce Clause significantly 
limits the ability of States and localities to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of 
interstate commerce, but it does not elevate free trade above all other values.”); Exxon 
Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978) (stating that the Commerce Clause 
does not protect “the particular structure or method of operation” of a market). 
 97. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994). 
 98. Id. at 391 (“In this light, the flow control ordinance is just one more instance of 
local processing requirements that we have long held invalid.”). 
 99. Id. (“The ordinance is no less discriminatory because in-state or in-town 
processors are also covered by the prohibition.”). 
 100. See generally Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1822-23; Karst, supra 
note 85, at 277-79; Evan Sauer, Case Note, United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 671 (2008). 
 101. Marc Lifsher, Cutting Through Haze of Governor’s Stance on Coal, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2005, at C-1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/dec/12/ 
business/fi-coal12. 
 102. Letter from Wyo. Infrastructure Auth. to the Cal. Energy Comm’n (Oct. 5, 
2005), available at http://www.wyia.org/Docs/Comments/CA%20Comments%2010-05-
05.pdf (discussing rule-making of S.B. 1368 standards). 
 301 
 
ADAMS (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2016  9:26 AM 
 
challenge, S.B. 1368’s drafters included some findings and evidence to 
counteract the interstate effects.103 
A.  An Effect, but Discriminatory? 
The first step in applying the dormant Commerce Clause test is to 
determine whether the state law is facially discriminatory.104  Judged 
alone, S.B. 1368 will burden out-of-state, coal-fired power plants more 
than in-state power plants.105  At the outset, S.B. 1368 parallels the 
regulation that the Court struck down in Washington Apple due to its 
out-of-state burden, but permitted as facially non-discriminatory in 
Clover Leaf. 106  An important aspect of this analysis is whether a court 
would hold that S.B. 1368 applies differently to in-state and out-of-state 
power or whether it delineates between coal and renewable power.  If it 
is the former, S.B. 1368 will be struck down; if it is the latter, it will 
move on to the second part of the Pike test. 
A clear intent to protect in-state residents is required to show facial 
discrimination when a court applies the Pike test.107 The California 
legislature and Public Utilities Commission (PUC) included findings, 
which are likely to be given deference in an extraterritoriality finding, 
that S.B. 1368’s purpose was to regulate the carbon emitted in the 
process of generating power for California.108  The support documents 
will be essential to a ruling that impacts on interstate trade are 
unintentional and merely a by-product of worthwhile legislation.109  The 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP) has shown 
evidence of this non-discriminatory purpose by signing a contract for 
renewable power from Utah, the very same state whose coal contracts 
would be limited by S.B. 1368.110  California is not attempting to isolate 
 103. See S.B.1368, 2005-2006 (Cal. 2006) (providing reasoning behind the law). 
 104. See supra Part I(a). 
 105. Brian H. Potts, Regulating Greenhouse Gas ‘Leakage‘: How California Can 
Evade The Impending Constitutional Attacks, 43 ELECTRICITY J. 19, 46 (2006). 
 106. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472-74 (1981); Hunt v. 
Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-54 (1977). 
 107. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978).  “The fact that 
the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not, by itself, 
establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce.”  Id.  Rather, if the regulation’s 
goal is to “place added costs,” then it is a violation.  See id. 
 108. CAL. PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N, POLICY STATEMENT ON GREENHOUSE GAS 
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (2005), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/REPORT/50432.pdf 
(“[T]o have any meaningful impact . . . GHG emissions reduction goals must be applied 
to the State’s electricity consumption, not just the State’s electricity production . . . .”). 
 109. See supra Part I. 
 110. CITY OF L.A. DEP’T OF WATER AND POWER, 2007 INTEGRATED RESOURCES 
PLAN, at D-14 & 15.  This is similar to the rationale in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 
449 U.S. 456, 472-74 (1981). 
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itself from a problem111 or give a benefit to only in-state power 
producers,112 so it is considered unlikely that a court would apply a strict 
scrutiny test.113  Much like the ruling in Clover Leaf, S.B. 1368 is not 
facially discriminatory because it does not differentiate between out-of-
state and in-state power; rather, it draws the line on GHG emissions.114 
B.  In the Balancing Test 
Assuming that S.B. 1368 will not be found to be facially 
discriminatory, a court will then have to weigh the impact on interstate 
commerce against the value of S.B. 1368 to California.115  As described 
in Pike, “If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question 
becomes one of degree.  And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated 
will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved . . . ”116  
The main issues in this application will be whether there are other, better 
options to regulate GHG, whether GHG reductions are a “local interest,” 
and whether potential GHG reductions outweigh the burden that the out-
of-state coal industry will face. 
 111. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392-94 (1994) 
(restating that in the waste-disposal cases the Court looked on any state regulation 
aiming to insulate itself from the interstate market in garbage with a jaundiced eye). 
 112. See supra notes 103, 108 and accompanying text, evidencing a purpose to limit 
GHG emissions, not affect interstate power trading.  While all coal burning plants are 
out-of-state, only half of California’s out-of-state power sources would be effected by 
S.B. 1368, evidencing that something besides geography was the determining factor.  See 
NYBERG ET AL., supra note 24, at 5.  This determination will also rest on facial-
discrimination finding and whether or not the Court finds the purpose to be valid. 
 113. Kysar & Meyler, supra note 22, at 1666; Patricia Weisselberg, Shaping the 
Energy Future in the American West: Can California Curb Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Out-of-State, Coal-Fired Power Plants Without Violating the Dormant Commerce 
Clause?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 185, 219 (2007); Peter Carl Nordberg, Comment, Excuse Me, 
Sir, But Your Climate’s on Fire: California’s S.B. 1368 and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2067, 2083-84 (2007). 
 114. Endrud, supra note 78, at 271-272; Farber, supra, note 36, at 894; Weisselberg, supra 
note 113, at 208-09; Potts, supra, note 105, at 4; Nordberg, supra note 113, at 2083-84; 
Yvonne Gross, Note, Kyoto, Congress, or Bust: The Constitutional Invalidity of State 
CO2 Cap-and-Trade Programs, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 205, 225 (2005). 
 115.  Some current Supreme Court Justices have rejected this analysis.  See supra 
Part I(b). 
 116. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)  (stating that the Court will 
strike down a law if it “the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive 
in relation to the putative local benefits”). 
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1.  Best Available Option 
In determining whether or not S.B. 1368 is the best available option to 
California, a court would look to whether California is actually pursuing 
the best path towards its purported goal of lessening the State’s GHG 
emissions.117  Expecting such a challenge, California legislators included 
reasoning for the law in its text that they are “protecting the state against 
financial and reliability risks . . .”118 and that S.B. 1368 “will reduce 
potential financial risk to California consumers for future pollution-
control costs.”119  These rationales rely on an understanding that future 
carbon emission laws will require GHG cuts, which is increasingly 
likely.120  Determining whether S.B. 1368 is the best option will require 
a weighing of the state interest in GHG regulation and a determination of 
California’s intent in passing S.B. 1368.121  In this case, the legislative 
history evidences intent to attack global warming, a problem that is 
currently addressed solely by reducing GHG emissions. 
Out-of-state power generators would likely argue that S.B. 1368 puts 
too large of a burden on utilities by failing to limit the State’s 
transportation sector’s GHG inputs.  Roughly 30% of California’s GHG 
emissions come from transportation,122 and any plan that ignores these 
emissions is opening itself up for a challenge on unfairly targeting one 
industry.  However, because S.B. 1368 was passed along with other state 
regulations on automobile GHG emissions,123 it is likely that a court 
would find that the overall regulatory scheme was to lessen carbon 
emissions, not punish an out-of-state industry.  This follows a recent 
Supreme Court decision upholding a tax break scheme to benefit in-state 
bonds in which the statutory package was examined as a whole and not 
 117. See supra Part II(a). 
 118. California Bill on GHG Standard for Power Purchases Hits Snags, CLEAN AIR 
REP. (Wash., D.C.), May 18, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 8469898. 
 119. S. 1368, 2005-2006 § 1(i) (Cal. 2006) (also including reasoning that they were 
protecting against “future reliability problems in electricity supplies,” id. § 1(j)). 
 120. This is due to changes in the federal government and climate-change policy as 
a whole.  Zachary Coile, Climate Change Remains a Top Priority, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 30, 
2008, at A-6, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/11/30/MNJ 
T14EFDT.DTL. 
 121. Compare with the intention relating the garbage regulation struck down in City 
of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1978).  The ban on out-of-state trash in 
City of Philadelphia is by definition different from a CO standard put on all power (both 
in-state and out-of-state). 
 122. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN 
APPENDICES: VOLUME I: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AND MEASURE DETAIL, at F-7 tbl.3 
(2008), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/appendices_volume1.pdf. 
 123. There have been two other bills limiting emissions from cars.  Assemb. 32, 
2005-2006 (Cal. 2006); S. 1493, 2001-2002 (Cal. 2002). 
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piecemeal.124  Furthermore, California allows for alternative methods for 
coal-fired power plants to meet the new requirements, including 
allowances for plants to sequester carbon emissions,125 evidencing a 
GHG-reduction goal, not an intention to burden out-of-state power.  In 
evaluating these two arguments, it is likely that a court would rule that 
S.B. 1368 is the best solution to the goal of lessening California’s GHG 
emissions. 
2.  Legitimate Local Purpose 
In order to pass the Pike test, California will have to show a strong 
local interest in preventing the effects of global warming.  
Commentators have challenged whether preventing climate change is 
appropriately categorized as a “local” state interest,126 and the issue has 
not been settled in court.  Massachusetts v. EPA is instructive, as it shed 
light on the Court’s opinion on the climate-change regulations127 and 
adjudged a state’s interest in preventing climate change as a whole.  
However, because it did not rule on a state law regulating GHG 
emissions, any application to S.B. 1368 would require a logical jump. 
In Mass. v. EPA, the Court ruled that Massachusetts had standing to 
challenge the EPA’s refusal to regulate GHGs because the State faced a 
threat from climate change “concrete” enough to show harm.128  The 
Court found that a state or person could not be denied standing to redress 
harm simply because the harm is on a large scale.129  From this ruling, it 
 124. Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1813-14 (2008) (ruling that the 
Court would not look at Kentucky’s conduct solely through the action at hand, but would 
examine Kentucky’s bond-and-tax system as applied to in-state and out-of-state interests 
in deciding whether the Kentucky tax violated the dormant Commerce Clause or fit into 
the market participant exception). 
 125. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(e)(6) (West 2009) (creating an exception for 
“permanently disposed” carbon dioxide “in geological formations in compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations”). 
 126. Gross, supra note 114, at 222-229.  Gross also makes the case that laws like 
S.B. 1368 violate the Foreign Affairs Power and the Supremacy Clause.  Id. at 229-35.  
However, her article came out before Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), was 
decided and before S.B. 1368 was enacted. 
 127. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516-25 (discussing standing and causation 
required for states to force action on global warming). 
 128. Id. at 517.  The majority appeared to give extra credence to the standing because 
the challenger was a state, a theory maligned by Chief Justice Roberts.  Id. at 548-49 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 526 n.24 (“‘To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply 
because many others are also injured simply because many others are also injured, 
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is clear that the Court values a state’s right to challenge an 
administrative decision not to regulate GHGs, noting that the relatively 
limited “local” interests that Massachusetts had in protecting its 
coastline from sea-level rise were not too small to deny the state an 
interest in spurring federal action.130  This would lead to an inference 
that California’s interest in preventing sea-level rise and problems with 
the state water supply would be given weight by the Court.131 
This weight, however, has only been proven to show that a state has 
the right to challenge federal inaction; the Court said nothing about 
whether this right extended to give a state the right to regulate GHGs on 
its own, as S.B. 1368 does.  The dissent’s opinion, that the state failed to 
meet the redressability requirement because of the limited scope of U.S. 
GHG reductions,132 would seem to be more relevant in a case involving 
the relatively small-scale action of a state.  It is unsettled whether this 
reasoning would draw over any Justices from the majority in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, which could upend the 5-4 decision and 
invalidate the weight that the Court gave to state interest in preventing 
climate change.133 
Beyond the scale issues of a state acting on climate change, there are 
questions related to the value assigned to local environmental 
regulations that affect interstate commerce.134  Commentators, citing 
West Lynn Creamery,135 have claimed that the purpose of limiting GHGs 
is not to be given much weight in the Pike test.136  While the value 
assigned to an environmental regulation is necessarily subjective, in 
West Lynn Creamery, the Court found the state’s environmental purpose 
to be lacking, if not entirely made up.137  How the Court would rule in 
the case of a substantive environmental purpose is unclear, but the ruling 
in West Lynn Creamery illustrates only how the Court will rule on a 
would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be 
questioned by nobody.’”) (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory 
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973)). 
 130. Id.. at 521-24 (“Agencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive 
problems in one fell regulatory swoop.”).  Chief Justice Roberts disagreed completely.  
Id. at 544-47 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 131. Farber, supra note 36, at 897. 
 132. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 545-46 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (writing 
that the weak causation link leads to an even weaker claim that the state can require 
national action, as even national action would not necessarily stem the loss of 
Massachusetts’s coastline.). 
 133. Most important to this analysis are the judges dormant Commerce Clause theories, 
outlined supra in Part I(B). 
 134. MacDougald, supra note 23, at 1441-43. 
 135. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204-05 (1994). 
 136. MacDougald, supra note 23, at 1443. 
 137. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 205 n.20. 
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baseless and clearly inadequate environmental purpose and does not 
extend to a substantive claim with legislative findings. 
3.  Rationally Related 
As a part of the Pike test, the Court must also find that S.B. 1368 is 
“rationally related” to the goal of preventing the harms of climate 
change.138  Most illustrative of this point is Washington Apple, where the 
Court found that additional labeling on apples was not rationally related 
to food safety; rather, the intention of the law was entirely to benefit in-
state apple growers.139  In an S.B. 1368 challenge, it will be much harder 
for California to prove the necessity of the regulation if it is seen as an 
attempt to provide a blueprint for federal legislation or has a purpose 
other than limiting GHG emissions.140  Some commentators have actually 
gone so far to state that California has, knowingly or not, “hit the 
regulatory sweet spot” for inducing federal action on GHGs, as power 
generators are potentially facing inconsistent and costly state regulations 
of their carbon emissions.141  If a court finds that California’s intention in 
passing S.B. 1368 was solely to provide a blueprint or create uncertainty, 
the State’s action will likely be found to be unrelated to the goal 
of preventing the harms of climate change.142  If the Court accepts the 
legislative and agency findings that S.B. 1368 is meant to lessen the 
effects of climate change in California, ensure electricity reliability, and 
modernize California’s electric infrastructure at face value, then the 
rational relationship required by the Pike test should be satisfied. 
4.  Extraterritoriality 
In a potential complaint, it is likely that any S.B. 1368 challenger 
would emphasize the “extraterritoriality” ruling in Brown-Forman Distillers 
Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Authority, which struck down a regulation 
 138. See supra Part I(a). 
 139. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-54 (1977). 
 140. Kysar & Meyler, supra note 22, at 1669; Chemerinsky et al., supra note 74, at 
10,659. 
 141. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The 
Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1533-34 (2007). 
 142. Farber, supra note 36, at 897 (citing Proctor & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 
509 F.2d 69, 81 (7th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) (ruling that providing 
an example to other communities was an acceptable rationale for the City of Chicago to 
affect interstate commerce)). 
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that limited its application to in-state liquor sellers, but effectively 
regulated prices in nearby states.143 At issue in the “extraterritorial” test 
is whether the state “directly controls” commerce “wholly outside the 
boundaries of a state”144  The Brown-Foreman court saw no rationale for 
the New York law beyond simple economic protection of in-state residents, 
which evidenced facial discrimination,145 a situation not present in the 
analysis of S.B. 1368.  When applying this test, a court should take into 
account that California is not regulating a transaction that takes place 
entirely out-of-state and, in writing S.B. 1368, had intentions more 
legitimate interests than protecting in-state businesses.146 
C.  The Market Participant Doctrine 
The dormant Commerce Clause has one notable applicable exception: 
the market participant doctrine.  Under this exception, states have full 
right to pass any rule, standard, requirement or guideline that governs 
their actions within a marketplace, as long as they are acting solely as 
market participants and not as regulators.147  The Supreme Court first 
acknowledged the market participant doctrine in 1976 when it ruled that 
Maryland could discriminate against out-of-state scrap dealers because 
the State was creating a market for abandoned cars in buying in-state 
cars, not just regulating their removal.148  Regulations limiting sales 
from a state cement factory to state residents149 and placing quotas on 
city residents working on city projects150 have been upheld when the 
state was buying and selling in the market.  This does not extend to state 
requirements on “downstream” activities beyond the state’s control as a 
buyer or seller,151 or when the state is not pursuing a traditional state 
participatory role in the market.152 
A recent Ninth Circuit case supports the proposition that a market 
participant exception could be used for publicly owned utilities to follow 
S.B. 1368.  In Engine Manufacturing Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality 
 143. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 581-
84 (1986). 
 144. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
 145. Id. at 336-37; Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 583. 
 146. The rationale is discussed supra in Part II(a). 
 147. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 148. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803, 809-10 (1976). 
 149. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980). 
 150. White v. Mass. Council of Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206-08 (1983). 
 151. S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984). 
 152. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1809-11 (2008).  The line between 
“downstream” and “traditional” actions lies between the timber-processing requirements 
on Alaska state forests in Wunnicke and the waste-processing guidelines of United Haulers. 
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Management District (SCAQMD),153 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Air 
Quality Management District was acting as a market participant when it 
required governmental agencies of all levels to stock their vehicle fleets 
with hybrid and low-emission cars.154  Although the Court remanded the 
case for full examination on different grounds, it was a signal that when 
the state, or any subdivision,155 is buying or selling in a market, it can 
include restrictions and qualifiers, regardless of their effect on interstate 
commerce.156 Furthermore, it found the Air Quality Management 
District to be acting as a participant when it regulated the type of 
vehicles that governmental agencies could purchase, not limiting its 
reach to its own District purchases.157 
For utilities enacting standards from S.B. 1368 to gain exemption 
under the market participant doctrine, the court would have to rule that 
the utility is a market participant. The regulating authorities (PUC, 
California Energy Commission [CEC], California Air Resources Board 
[CARB] amongst others involved in application of California’s climate-
change laws) are not market participants.  Privately owned utilities are 
also not governmental entities.  Publicly owned utilities, however, do 
qualify as market participants because they are technically government 
entities and participate in the market as buyers, sellers and generators. 
The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP) and all 
smaller publicly owned utilities in the State could impose nearly any 
regulation or standard, no matter whether it is in violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, because DWP’s actions within the marketplace are 
those of a participant, not a regulator.158  DWP is a department within 
the City of Los Angeles, which means that it functions more like an 
agency or an arm of government.159  This is distinct from California’s 
two other major utilities, San Diego Gas & Electric and Pacific Gas and 
Electric, which are privately owned and operated.  DWP’s status as a 
 153. 498 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2007).  This case was decided in the Ninth Circuit, has 
not, as of publishing time, been submitted to the Supreme Court for cert., and has not yet 
returned to the District Court. 
 154. Id. at 1039-1042. 
 155. Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of Education of Anchorage, 952 F.2d 1173, 
1179-80 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 156. SCAQMD, 498 F.3d at 1039. 
 157. Id. at 1045-46. 
 158. See Farber, supra note 36, at 896. 
 159. Los Angeles Department of Water & Power, Our Service and History, 
http://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/cms/ladwp000508.jsp (last visited Nov. 11, 2009). 
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municipal utility gives it the freedom to undertake any contractual 
obligations its Commissioners and CEO think wise, and for interstate 
commerce purposes, it is treated as any other business.  According to 
precedent that looks for “direct state participation in the market,” DWP 
and all smaller public utilities should meet the participation burden as 
they buy, sell, and own the means to generate power.160 
Arguments have been made for switching to a system where all utility 
electricity passes through the State’s control so that California can avail 
itself of the exception.161 However, this system seems unlikely as it 
would give near complete control over the electricity market to the 
State—a situation that is unpopular amongst consumers, regulators, and 
utilities alike.162  Furthermore, while commentators have discussed the 
possibility of gaining the market participant exception by treating carbon 
credits as a good,163 this seems like an untenable solution because the 
Court has stated that it examines a state’s participation in the market, not 
just the good’s presence.164 The current structure of the California 
electricity market affords the market participant doctrine exception to 
DWP but does not extend to the other utilities in the State.  This is a 
notable exception, as DWP provides power for nearly 1.5 million homes 
and businesses and produces over 26 billion kilowatt-hours.165 
 160. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1810 (2008) (selling bonds is 
a traditional state purpose); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803, 809-
10 (1976) (buying Maryland scrap cars created a market that the state participated in, so 
interstate effects were unimportant); Farber, supra note 36, at 896.  While the regulation 
is coming from the state, DWP’s exemption is valid.  See Treg A. Julander, State Resident 
Preference Statutes and the Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 541, 579 (2002). 
 161. Potts, supra note 105, at 9-10 (citing A.B. 1X, a law passed during the 
California energy crisis that gave the state control over utilities, and arguing that this 
would give the state complete coverage under the market participant doctrine). 
 162. Id. at 10.  Also, after the energy crisis of the early 2000s, the state is unlikely 
to attempt to enter the electricity market in such an active way. 
 163. Kysar & Meyler, supra note 22, at 1658-61.  Much like in Alexandria Scrap, 
California’s regulation has the effect of altering the market, but in an acceptable way.  
As Maryland was “entered into the market to bid up the price,” California has ordered 
the PUC to bid up the price of renewable power. 
 164. See supra Part II(a).  This is also a form model application, but likely to be 
applied only when making the credits “goods” themselves because of a clear intent to 
regulate the market, not participate in it. 
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IV.  PREDICTIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS                                        
FOR CLIMATE LEGISLATION  
A.  Potential Challenges 
If a case challenging S.B. 1368 is brought to the Supreme Court, a 
ruling will undoubtedly be split.  Testing S.B. 1368 for a dormant 
Commerce Clause violation includes enough variables to make predicting 
potential rulings difficult.  It can be assumed that such a case will result 
in two major splits in the Supreme Court: on the dormant Commerce 
Clause and on the value of public health and environmental regulations.  
Justices Kennedy and Alito are likely to see S.B. 1368 as invalid, as they 
have consistently ruled that the dormant Commerce Clause exists 
primarily to create a free and open market, and that a regulation 
impacting the movement of an article of interstate commerce is given 
little weight in the Pike test.  Equally as likely, Justices Thomas and 
Scalia will rule in favor of upholding S.B. 1368.  While their dissent in 
Massachusetts v. EPA leads one to believe that they would assign little 
value to a state regulating GHGs to prevent what they called a global 
problem,166 this analysis would be preempted because valuation of the 
law is done in the Pike balancing test, something both Justices Thomas 
and Scalia regard as an improper application of the Constitution. Justice 
Breyer is also likely to uphold S.B. 1368, as he looks primarily for 
differential treatment based on geography to invalidate a state regulation. 
Predicting the rulings of Justices Roberts, Stevens, and Ginsburg, is 
imperfect, as all would come to their decisions using different paths.  
Chief Justice Roberts would likely weigh the desire to allow states to 
regulate against a climate-change threat he called into question in 
Massachusetts v. EPA,167 while allowing for state environmental regulations 
as he did in United Haulers.168  Justices Stevens and Ginsburg would 
likely weigh the value they assigned state climate-change laws in their 
standing ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA against their desire for national 
standards in what is clearly a global issue.  Though a specific vote 
prediction is difficult and speculative at best, one can predict that S.B. 
1368 would be upheld by the current Supreme Court. 
 166. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 549-60 (2007) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
 167. Id. at 535-38 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 168. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 
U.S. 330, 345 (2007); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Cooperative Federalism 
The interplay of state and federal law on climate change is not yet 
settled, although attendees of the 2009 Energy and Climate Law Journal 
Symposium at the University of San Diego generally expect that the 
legislation coming from current discussions will be one of cooperative 
federalism.169  Cooperative federalism is the concept that state, federal, 
and local governments work together, often with federal regulations 
providing a minimum level of protection, with states given the power to 
enact stronger standards.170  The best example in the environmental field 
is the Clean Air Act,171 as the federal Environmental Protection Agency 
sets a national standard but leaves it up to the states to develop the best 
way to attain such standards.  In this way, state plans are adopted as 
federal law so that localized policy decisions carry the weight and 
extend a federal law’s reach and adaptability.  Under this regime, state 
and local governments can utilize site-specific and particularized 
knowledge while making the most of the heft and enforcement power of 
the federal government.  The federal government applies a “floor,” or 
minimum standard, while it allows states to enact a “ceiling,” or more 
stringent level of protection.172 
Under such a system, the economics of a cap-and-trade system 
become complex because the two caps would theoretically operate in the 
same sphere.  Developing a carbon regulatory system is complex 
enough, but combining state and regional cap-and-trade systems will 
lead to complications.  In a state with a more stringent carbon emissions 
regulatory scheme, emission credits utilized under the federal program 
are pushed out-of-state, much like under the leakage concept, because 
the credits become unusable in that state, but fully valid under the 
 169. This inference was taken from speeches and conversations held at the Symposium 
on Feb. 20, 2009. 
 170. Jonathan Binder & Jared Snyder, The Changing Climate of Cooperative 
Federalism: The Dynamic Role of the States in a National Strategy to Combat Climate 
Change, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 233 (2009). 
 171. Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the 
Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global 
Warming¸ 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 817 (2008). 
 172. The last failed federal bill, the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 
2191, 110th Cong. (2008), specifically granted states the rights to regulate carbon emissions, 
but gave them no role in the regulatory structure.  The federal cap was still most important, 
and for all purposes, the overall cap.  If this situation is duplicated in upcoming bills, then 
states that do further limit carbon emissions will see regulated industries and 
power production moving out-of-state, only to sell the same power back.  This is exactly 
why federal legislation has to allow for states to regulate based upon consumption levels, 
not just production. 
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federal cap.173  This results in state laws simply moving emissions, not 
actually reducing them, because the important cap is still the federal one, 
not the state program.174 Addressing this problem by “sealing off” states 
as caps unto themselves destroys the entire economic benefit of a 
national cap-and-trade market by creating fifty separated markets, and is 
thus a poor solution.175 
The main thrust of any potential solution should be to allow states to 
hold themselves to higher standards than federal law but to do so in a 
way that eliminates emissions rather than simply moving them out-of-
state.  For example, if California wants to cut the emissions it is responsible 
for, while paying the higher per kilowatt hour fee or increased taxes, it 
should be able to do so. 
Under any cooperative federalism regulatory model, the only way for 
California to actually affect lower emissions as a state would be to pass 
laws that regulate what is consumed in-state rather than solely what is 
produced in-state.176  This becomes clear if California is given direct 
control over the allotment of carbon emissions in a federal program that 
correlate with the amount of carbon it is responsible for.177  If the federal 
floor is distributed by the federal government, California reductions are 
sold elsewhere.  But if California is allotted its carbon credits under the 
federal system and has the authority to withhold a number of credits to 
set up its own set of carbon reductions, then the overall net emissions of 
GHGs should be lowered.  If federal law fails to allow for state laws that 
address in-state consumption, these early actors will be put at a 
disadvantage as federal law becomes the floor—not legally, but in the 
economics of the system.  If federal law is going to follow the 
cooperative federalism model, the only way it can do so under the 
constraints of a global problem, is to allow states to regulate every joule, 
watt, and gallon of gas consumed in the state, rather than just those 
 173. This concept is explained and explored in MEGHAN MCGUINNESS & A. DENNY 
ELLERMAN, THE EFFECTS AND INTERACTIONS BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE CLIMATE 
POLICIES, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 175, 199-200, Dec., 2008. 
 174. This assumes that the federal program would set a cap and then apportion the  
permits themselves instead of giving them to the state to apportion or retire as they see fit. 
 175. See MCGUINNESS & ELLERMAN, supra note 173, at 210-11 (explaining that 
state-by-state caps deny the flexibility for a market-based system to find the 
cheapest pollution reductions). 
 176. California consumes much more energy than it produces, which is pretty much 
true for everything else except food stuffs and entertainment. 
 177. This is further explored and explained in Kaswan, supra note 9, at Part II(B). 
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produced in-state.  And if the goal is to reduce GHG emissions and grant 
states some level of control in the system, dividing credits for allocation 
by the states is key to any program’s success.178 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Potential future lawsuits brought to strike S.B. 1368 as a violation of 
the dormant Commerce Clause are likely to fail.  The law itself does not 
treat in-state and out-of-state power differently, drawing dividing lines 
based on emissions not geography, so S.B. 1368 is likely not facially 
discriminatory.  In the Pike test, the “legitimate local purpose” question 
is less clear, but if Massachusetts v. EPA is extended, the State’s 
standing requirements will be met, which will likely lead to a court 
giving state climate-change regulations great weight.  While standing to 
force federal action does not necessarily equate to a finding of sufficient 
local interest, the two are logically related enough that a strong argument 
can be made.  Even without Massachusetts v. EPA lending itself to a 
finding of a full, legitimate local interest, it is likely that courts would 
find S.B. 1368 to be the best available option to California to address the 
State’s legitimate interest in stemming carbon emissions and providing 
incentives to businesses to do the same. 
Simply because S.B. 1368 would likely be upheld, does not make it 
the best solution.  State-level action is an awkward fit for climate-change 
regulation because states cannot sign agreements with foreign countries 
and cannot go beyond their borders in their regulations.  However, in the 
absence of federal legislation on an issue of such importance, states have 
had to fill the void, and the work they have done should not be negated 
by federal law.  The role for California in the federal structure is to be, 
as Justice Brandeis said, a “laborator[y] of democracy”179 and provide an 
example, good or bad, for national action.  This role is unlikely to go 
away, particularly as the common theory on forthcoming federal climate 
laws is that they will create a cooperative federalism system.  Such a 
system, in allowing the federal government to set the floor and states to 
set their own ceilings, has the most potential to produce a comprehensive 
and worthwhile climate policy for the nation, but only if it is done 
correctly.  And only if states are allowed to enforce laws that tend to 
their consumption, not just production, as S.B. 1368 does. 
 178. See id. at Part V for why federal standards should be distributed to the states 
for state-induced reductions to result in an actual net reductions of GHGs. 
 179. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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